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Abstract  
In 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, a decision widely 
known as ‘Brexit’.  This analysis compares two competing theories – institution and identity – to 
explain why. Four historical events, chronologically ordered from 1945 to 2016, are examined 
with both identity and institution analysis to explain British integration and its subsequent 
withdrawal from the European Union.  Through this analysis, one can conclude the United 
Kingdom’s decision to withdraw in 2016 stemmed from a variety of reasons, but each of these 
can be explained by identity (a sense of nationalism), or institution (EU relationships).  
Nationalism around the world has increased exponentially in recent years, evolving from 
small grassroots factions into major political parties. This ideology has formed a sense of identity 
in the United Kingdom that differs from EU governance.  British pride and disassociation from a 
European identity have also caused sociological differences that sparked and energized the 
Brexit movement.  
The relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union is complex.  The 
United Kingdom was never institutionalized with other member states to possess the same 
values, norms, or legal system, and historically, they have shown diverging interests and a rocky 
relationship.  
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Introduction 
“The world is not the most pleasant place. Eventually, your parents leave you and nobody is 
going to go out of their way to protect you unconditionally. You need to learn to stand up for 
yourself and what you believe in and sometimes, pardon my language, kick some ass.” 
-Queen Elizabeth II1 
 June of 2016 changed the entire world as we know it.  The United Kingdom’s decision to 
leave the European Union sparked arguably the most significant series of events to happen in 
Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991.  The vote to leave sent shockwaves throughout 
the continent that reverberated around the world.  Many believe the British vote to leave signaled 
the kiss of death on the European Union as we know it, while others believe it marks the 
beginning of the end of the United Kingdom’s reign as a strong world power.  For years, the 
relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union has been rocky and the 
British decision to leave was just another example of this. 
 To fully understand the United Kingdom’s (UK’s2) complex relationship with the 
European Union,3 it is crucial to understand the process of European integration and a bit about 
the European Union itself. European integration has been traditionally understood as the struggle 
between national sovereignty and pan-European supranational governance.4 Optimists see the 
EU’s conception and integration as a progressive step toward a more homogenous Europe. 
Pessimists, also called Euroskeptics, believe economic issues and enduring national rivalries 
cannot be solved with cooperation and integration.  
                                                        
1 Ghosh, “Queen Elizabeth II’s Memorable Quotes On Monarch’s 91st Birthday.” 
2 United Kingdom, UK, British, and Britain are used interchangeably herein. 
3 European Union, EU, EC, and EEC all refer to the governing European intergovernmental organization and change 
depending on the time and date mentioned. 
4 Rosamond, “Globalisation and the European Union.” 
 
4 
 Both optimistic and pessimistic views of the EU are prevalent around Europe. Opinions 
surrounding the merits of European integration vary greatly depending on the issue, the point in 
time, and the individual.  There is a large gap between those in the United Kingdom who favor 
European Union membership versus those who prefer sovereignty. The purpose of this paper is 
to understand this dichotomy and how it ultimately led to withdrawal.  
To understand the British views regarding EU membership, it is necessary to examine the 
European Union itself. Following a discussion about European integration, this paper will 
examine both optimistic and pessimistic points of view regarding the European Union. British 
identity and European institutionalism are used to analyze the relationship over four periods in 
time. These chapters highlight pinnacle moments when identity and institutionalism have come 
to a head. They include 1. The UK joining the European Union in 1975, 2. The decision to keep 
the pound sterling in 2003, 3. Evolving national security policies post-2005, and finally 4. The 
2016 Brexit referendum.  
A Brief History of European Integration 
“The formation of the European Union is one of the most peculiar events in world history…” 
-Engin Erdem, 2006 
 Intergovernmental organizations (IGO’s), like the United Nations, World Trade 
Organization, and NATO, are a feature of daily life in many regions, but nowhere more so than 
modern day Europe.5 The levels of integration in Europe, pooling together sovereignty and 
uniting political communities, soar above all other international institutions.  No other set of 
nations around the world has been able to emulate the model the Europeans developed. The 
European Union has overall succeeded in bringing peace, prosperity, and democracy to Europe 
for almost 70 years. 
                                                        
5 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.” 
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 In the 1950s, the Cold War dominated the east and west. Even so, Europeans from all 
nations sought comradery. Nations hoped to end the decades of bloody wars that plagued Europe 
with newfound cooperation.  The first step taken was to integrate the European Coal and Steel 
Communities (ECSC).  Six founding countries met in 1951 and established the Treaty of Paris to 
integrate the coal and steel industries in Western Europe.  The original members were France, 
West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.6 The United Kingdom was 
invited to participate in the ECSC but did not sign the treaty because “they disliked many of the 
supranational and technocratic elements of the treaty.”7  
 The British decision to opt out of the ECSC was not unanimous. In 1945, years before the 
ECSC was even created, Britain’s Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin expressed a desire to resurrect 
Britain’s preeminent international standing.8 With Japan on the brink of surrendering World War 
II and the British Labour Party (LP) freshly in power,9 Bevin and the Foreign Office discussed 
the idea of a more integrated Europe.  He outlined a grand design to build political, military, and 
economic cooperation with Europe.10 “It might seem that Britain was ready in 1945 to undertake 
the close commitment to the continent in peacetime from which she had historically shrunk,” 
Professor of Politics at the University of Leicester John Young said.11 However, the results 
weren’t nearly as productive as Bevin had hoped, proven by Britain’s deviance from the ECSC 
in 1951. 
 Shortly after the ECSC was created, the Treaties of Rome (1957) established the 
European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC was an association designed to integrate not 
                                                        
6 “European Coal and Steel Community.” 
7 “Why Did the United Kingdom Not Join the European Union When It Started? - UK in a Changing Europe 
8 Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-92. 
9 Young. 
10 Young. 
11 Young. 
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only coal and steel in Europe, but the economies too. Britain, just as they did with the ECSC, 
declined membership in the EEC. “Britain, since 1945, has repeatedly distanced itself from 
efforts to create supranational institutions in Europe. Instead, the country based its political and 
economic future, in the international sphere, on the American alliance and the Empire-
Commonwealth.” 12 
 At the turn of the century, the economy in the UK struggled in comparison to the rest of 
Europe. “In retrospect, the failure to fulfill Bevin’s grand design of August 1945 seemed to point 
major errors of judgment by British policymakers,” Young said.13 It was Conservative Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan who, in an attempt to repair the suffering British economy, decided 
the UK needed to join the EEC in 1961.14 After a tumultuous and lengthy admissions process 
that is discussed later in this paper, the United Kingdom, along with Denmark and Ireland, were 
approved to join the EEC in 1973. The acceptance of these states raised the total number of EEC 
members to nine.  
Shortly before the UK’s admission, the six original states stopped charging customs fees 
in trade with one other and agreed on joint control over food production.15 This boosted their 
economies greatly. However, the monetary boost didn’t last long, as energy and economic crises 
flooded Europe as a result of the brutal Arab-Israeli war.  The EEC leaders championed the idea 
of upholding the economies and strengths of all European states, even non-members.  Thus, as 
dictatorships in nations like Portugal and Spain came to a head, European Parliament, the 
governing body of the EEC, began transferring huge sums of money and infrastructure to these 
lower-income states.16 
                                                        
12 Young. 
13 Young. 
14 Ludlow et al., “When Britain First Applied to Join the EU.” 
15 Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-92. 
16 Rosamond, “Globalisation and the European Union.” 
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 The economy in Europe fluctuated greatly throughout the 1970s, but real concrete change 
developed in the 1980s. The EU first started looking east, when the Polish trade union gained 
attention following the Gdansk shipyard strikes during the summer of 1980.17  In 1981, Greece 
became the 10th member of the EU and in 1986, Spain and Portugal became the 11th and 12th 
members, respectively.18 That same year, the Single European Act (SEA, 1986) was signed 
creating the European Single Market. The Single Market offered a solution to the onerous trade 
conditions that existed across borders by guaranteeing the free movement of goods, capital, 
services, and labor throughout member states.19 
 In 1989, the Berlin Wall was torn down and the border between East and West Germany 
opened for the first time in 28 years.20 The fall of the wall led to the reunification of Germany 
and brought an end to communism in Europe. “After the Berlin Wall came down, I visited that 
city and I will never forget it. The abandoned checkpoints. The sense of excitement about the 
future. The knowledge that a great continent was coming together. Healing those wounds of our 
history is the central story of the European Union.” British Prime Minister David Cameron said 
in a speech to the EU in 2013.21 
 The 1990s were equally progressive.  “In the early 1990s, organizations such as the 
Council of Europe (CE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
moved quickly to expand.” Jeremy Checkel, International Studies Professor, said.22 In December 
1991, EEC leaders met in Maastricht, Netherlands, to discuss greater European cooperation on 
                                                        
17 “Gdansk Shipyard Strike Launched a Revolution.” 
18 Anonymous, “The 28 Member Countries of the EU.” 
19 Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-92. 
20 Smith, “How 1989 Changed the History of European Integration.” 
21 “David Cameron’s EU Speech - Full Text.” 
22 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.” 
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all levels.23 The main result of this conference was the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty officially 
created the European Union (EU), as the EEC which incorporated and renamed. It also granted 
EU citizenship to citizens of all member states, enabling people to vote and run for office in 
European Parliament elections. The treaty also provided the introduction of the Euro, a universal 
currency. The Maastricht treaty resulted in greater cooperation regarding the environment, 
policing, the economy, and all social policies in European member states.  
 In 1995, the newly re-branded European Union gained three more members: Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden.24  That same year, Schengen, a small town in Luxembourg, created the 
Schengen Agreements. These agreements allowed EU citizenry to travel across the border in 
Luxembourg freely and without a passport check.25 Four years later, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
was signed, officially incorporating Luxembourg’s Schengen agreements allowing for free travel 
across all member states.  This treaty also gave European Parliament stronger powers and 
increased general provisions on member states.  With borders broken down by the Schengen 
Zone and the rapid increase of technology, communication and interconnectedness increased 
exponentially. 
 The early 21st century in the European Union was marked by EU expansion to the east. 
Ten new countries attained EU membership in 2004.  In 2007, two more were added, bringing 
the total number to 27.26 More member states decided to adopt the Euro as well, and it quickly 
became the primary currency for most Europeans.27 The United Kingdom was a rare exception - 
they voted to retain the pound sterling in 2003. The September 11th, 2001, attacks in the United 
                                                        
 
24 Europa, “The 28 Member Countries of the EU.”  
25 “Schengen.” 
26 Europa, “The 28 Member Countries of the EU.” 
27 Alesina and Giavazzi, Europe and the Euro. 
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States launched a global war on terror and led to increased security cooperation in the EU. 
Member states began to work together more heavily to fight crime and terrorism.  
 In 2008, a financial crisis rocked the global economy and plummeted Europe into its 
deepest recession since the 1930s.28 Several countries experienced the collapse of financial 
institutions, high government debt, and rapidly rising bond yields. The collapse of Iceland’s 
banking system was the first calamity, but similar circumstances quickly spread to Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain.29  
 In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon amended the Maastricht Treaty and other integrating 
documents, increasing the EU’s governing authority.30 The Treaty of Lisbon was initially met 
with immense opposition and even put to a referendum in Ireland. Ireland’s public vote actually 
rejected the Treaty, jeopardizing the entire document. However, Ireland held a second 
referendum in 2009, voting this time in favor of the Treaty. Once Ireland was on board, other 
hesitant countries followed and the proposed Treaty was eventually ratified.   
The Lisbon Treaty included an important clause, Article 50. This clause was given little 
public attention at the time, due to the economic crises, but became important in 2010 and 2016. 
Article 50 outlines the provisions under which a country can leave the EU.31 
 In 2010, Article 50 was considered as the Greek economy spiraled out control. EU 
leaders addressed the possibility of a “Grexit” (“Greek exit”) from the Eurozone and the EU.  
However, Article 50 only addresses a country’s voluntary separation from the EU, not terms 
under which a member state might be expelled.32 Ultimately, Greece reached an agreement with 
its creditors and solved its immediate crisis and the Article 50 discussion stopped. 
                                                        
28 Kenton, “European Sovereign Debt Crisis Definition.” 
29 Kenton. 
30 Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-92. 
31 Rosamond, “Globalisation and the European Union.” 
32 Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-92. 
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The Greek economic downturn was just one of the serious challenges to fall upon the EU 
during this decade. The EU had to help several countries, in addition to Greece, with their 
economies. As a result, the EU established a banking union to create safer and more reliable 
banks. “As the financial crisis evolved into the euro area debt crisis, it became clear that deeper 
integration of the banking system was needed for the Euro area countries, which are particularly 
interdependent.” the European Commission said.33 The banking union ensures EU banks are 
stronger and better supervised to prevent future crises.   
 Though the economy was poor in most of the member states, the European Union was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012, “For over six decades contributed to the advancement of 
peace and reconciliation, democracy, and human rights in Europe.”34 This award showed that the 
success of the European Union was less about the economy, and more about political 
cooperation.  In 2013, Croatia became the 28th member state, making it the most recent member 
to join the EU. Simultaneous to their admission, the EU began heavily prioritizing climate 
change. Though the economy was still poor, the political side of the EU was thriving. 
 2014 proposed new challenges to the EU’s political harmony. The first challenge 
occurred when Russia forcibly annexed the Ukrainian Republic of Crimea. The EU responded, in 
partnership with the United States, Canada, and other allies, with economic sanctions on Russia. 
These sanctions restricted western financial/service markets designated for Russian enterprises 
and placed embargos on Russian exports.35 The actions signaled unity amongst members of the 
EU, but it adversely affected their economies. The sanctions in Russia caused a massive loss in 
                                                        
33 European Commission, “What Is the Banking Union?” 
34 “The Nobel Peace Prize 2012.” 
35 Review, “Sanctions after Crimea.” 
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export opportunities, as it forced Russia into a recession which drove down the number of goods 
and services being sold to Russians.36   
Around the same time, the EU began dealing with immense unrest in the Middle East.  
More than 1 million migrants arrived in Europe in 2016 after the Russian bombing escalated 
Syria’s civil war.37 Under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, those escaping war or persecution 
are protected and can’t be turned away.38  The massive influx of migrants stirred fear in locals 
and created divisions among the EU nations.  The threat of Islamic terrorism was correlated to 
the migrant crisis, and nationalist-leaning politicians fanned concerns over the refugees.39  This 
political attention caused many European citizens to fear Middle Eastern migrants and refugees.  
 Also, in 2014,  European Parliamentary elections were held. The poor economy, the 
struggling relationship with Russia, and the migrant crisis caused public opinion to shift more 
toward the negative aspects of the EU. Euroskeptic political parties from all states, especially the 
UK, campaigned for a vote against the EU in the Parliamentary election. Multiple Euroskeptics 
were elected to the European Parliament, creating a split government regarding the value of the 
European Union.40 
 This brings us to today. The European Union has evolved into a diverse body with a 
complex framework that includes multiple governing bodies, such as the Council, Parliament, 
Court, and Commission.  The power of these branches has varied over time, but the EU 
Parliament and Court are seen as increasingly powerful institutions. “The increasing power of 
                                                        
36 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.” 
37 “Why European Tension Is Rising Over Migrants (Again).” 
38 “Why European Tension Is Rising Over Migrants (Again).” 
39 Yourish, Watkins, and Giratikanon, “Where ISIS Has Directed and Inspired Attacks Around the World.” 
40 FitzGibbon, “Euroscepticism and the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections.” 
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European level supranational institutions such as the European Court of Justice demonstrates that 
it has gone beyond nation states.” political scientist Engin Erdem said.41 
 Membership in the European Union today varies from state to state. While the European 
Union employs common rules and regulations, its continued power is because it recognizes 
states’ differences.  Each state has unique needs, economic strengths and weaknesses, priorities, 
and norms.  Each state also has an independent history, that constructed their nation and 
government, and an independent reason why they chose to integrate.  
Attempts to generalize integration rationale on a large scale or even regional basis are 
relatively meaningless.  “In essence, scholars might have been attempting to generate common 
theories out of radically distinct dependent variables. That is, they might actually be trying to 
explain different things,” said Ben Rosamund, Professor at the University of Copenhagen.42 
 Accordingly, this paper will therefore focus only on the United Kingdom and its 
relationship with the European Union.   The UK decided to leave an economic and political 
partnership with 27 European countries, as well as a formidable security coalition fighting 
terrorism, organized crime, and cybercrime.  They are leaving an organization with a 
comprehensive migration policy that accepted an influx of refugees, and they are the first EU 
nation to vote to leave. 
Theoretical Analysis 
 With strong benefits for membership on the table and no precedent for disintegration, 
many wonder why the UK voted to leave. This is exactly the question I analyze in this paper. I 
argue that the UK has been fighting a war between identity and institution since its genesis. The 
identity side values British congruence, nationalism, and state pride. The institutional side 
                                                        
41 Erdem, “European Integration and International Relations Theory.” 
42 Rosamond, “Brexit and the Problem of European Disintegration.” 
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emphasizes the importance of cooperation with Europe. In this section, I will discuss the United 
Kingdom’s two sides through a theoretical analysis comparing and contrasting institutions and 
identity.  
Institutions 
“Beyond differences and geographical boundaries, there lies a common interest.”  
– Jean Monnet, French economist and diplomat.43 
 Hospitals, schools, religious groups, political systems, the court system, mass media, and 
militaries. These are just a few examples of institutions that uphold our global society today. 
Institutions all over the world invest in physical and human capital, provide us with new 
technologies and research, mobilize governments and businesses, and so much more. Institutions 
are a vastly important part of our society and institutionalism is a theory that attempts to explain 
their role.  
 The study of institutionalism covers a wide realm.  Institutionalism draws from previous 
work in a wide array of disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, 
anthropology, and psychology. It is frequently categorized by the attention it gives to history as 
well; Oftentimes the two are lumped together in what is known as historical institutionalism. 44 A 
full overview of institutionalist theory would require going all the way back to back to Aristotle, 
but this ancient theory of institutionalism barely scratched the surface of its modern role. 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, institutionalism appeared in American scholarship 
for the first time.  American economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen criticized the ancient 
philosophers’ approach for its focus on individual people, as opposed to the institution or society 
itself. Veblen argued that the cause and effect should be flipped - individuals are shaped by their 
                                                        
43 “A Quote by Jean Monnet.” 
44 “Institutionalism | Social Science.” 
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institutional and sociocultural context, not the other way around. His theory relies on the fact that 
institutions produce order, and this order creates expectation. Individuals orient their behavior 
accordingly.45 
In the mid-20th Century, an anthropological version of institutionalism emerged through 
the work of Austro-Hungarian scholar Karl Polanyi.  Polanyi defined institutions as uniting, 
stabilizing, and structure-giving.46 He also stressed the importance of noneconomic institutions, 
such as religion.  His perception of institutions foreshadowed an additional branch of 
institutionalism soon to come - sociological institutionalism. 
Polanyi’s work also pushed institutionalism to appear more in political science. Theorists 
like American Carl Friedrich began combining institutionalist theory with constitutionalism and 
democracy.  For Friedrich, this intersect was characterized by a concern for individual autonomy 
and institutional arrangements.47  Friedrich was careful to note that institutions must reflect 
social and political reality, as without legitimacy, they are greatly weakened.  
Around the time Friedrich was studying institutionalism and democracy in the United 
States, the ECSC developed, creating a never-before-seen international institution in Europe. The 
ECSC, which eventually became the EU, has fostered economic growth, fair trade, employment, 
stability, and prosperity in Europe for decades.  The institution promotes security, protects 
citizens, and makes travel easier. Many argue without the EU, European countries could never be 
the global force that they are today. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the United Kingdom’s relationship with the 
European Union. Given the EU is an institution itself, institutionalism a crucial theory for 
integration analysis. There are two types of institutionalism relevant to the UK’s membership –
                                                        
45 “Institutionalism | Social Science.” 
46 “Institutionalism | Social Science.” 
47 “Institutionalism | Social Science.” 
 
15 
sociological and historical. These two perspectives explain why 1. Certain British citizens favor 
the EU institution, and 2. How perspectives change over time. 
First, sociological institutionalism is the process of inducting actors into the norms and 
rules of a given community.48 Sociological institutionalists see human behavior as a moldable, 
meaning our social surroundings and institutions create identities.49 Oftentimes, institutions have 
a social structure in which shared norms and rules play a considerable role, and therefore, 
similarities are promoted amongst members.  Jeremey Checkel, a professor of international law, 
notes that these socializing effects are often uneven and surprisingly weak.  “In no way can 
(sociological institutionalism) be construed as shaping a new, post-national identity.” He says. 50  
 Second, historical institutionalism looks at when a shift occurs and how.51 Historical 
institutionalists believe institutions, both formal and informal, evolve over time and guide the 
behavior of political actors in the policy-making process accordingly.52 Institutions do not 
perform with perfect efficiency and institutional rules are slow to change. Those factors must be 
considered in any institutional membership analysis.53 Historical institutionalism seeks to define 
and explain real-world political outcomes using the historical legacy of institutional structures 
and feedbacks available.54 It also puts the will of nation-states at the center of institutional 
development and looks at the shifts in institutional rules, constraints, and the responses to them 
over time. 
                                                        
48 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.” 
49 “Institutionalism | Social Science.” 
50 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.” 
51 Checkel. 
52 “Institutionalism | Social Science.” 
53 Breuning, “Role Theory in Foreign Policy.” 
54 Breuning. 
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 The desire to join the European Union demonstrates one places greater importance upon 
cooperation and the success of the whole rather than independence and sovereignty. This two-
part theoretical diversity assessing sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism is 
utilized to assess the British – EU relationship because it provides the fullest picture.  
Sociological institutionalism highlights the differences between the UK and mainland Europe, 
while historical institutionalism documents the changes over time in the relationship between the 
UK and the EU and incorporates other factors, such as economic crises, security issues, 
immigration debates, and more.  
The EU has become a major force in Europe, making institutionalism a necessary theory 
to analyze when studying British integration and withdrawal from the institution.  The benefits of 
integration have sold many British citizens on the EU, yet there a large percentage in the United 
Kingdom prioritizes values less congruent with institutionalism, like nationalism.   
Identity 
“In my lifetime, all our problems have come from mainland Europe and all the  
solutions have come from the English-speaking nations across the world.” 
– Margaret Thatcher, Speech to Scottish Tories, 1999. 55 
 Nationalist factions began gaining traction all around the world in recent years, from the 
United States to China to the United Kingdom. Generically, nationalism is an ideology based on 
the premise that an individual’s loyalty and devotion to his or her nation-state surpasses other 
individual or group interests.56  Historian Liah Greenfield dates this ideology back to sixteenth-
century England and the Protestant Reformation.57  The Protestant Reformation put an end to an 
integrated world, previously unified by Catholicism and the Holy Roman Empire.  
                                                        
55 “Margaret Thatcher Quote.” 
56 Britannica, “Nationalism | Definition, History, & Facts.” 
57 Greenfeld, “Nationalism.” 
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When nationalism was first recognized after the Protestant Reformation, the principle 
was generally that each nationality should form its own state and that state should include all 
members of said ethnicity. Religious differences, political conflicts, and competitive spirit pitted 
nation against nation and individuality replaced the universal consciousness that previously 
united citizens. 
 Nationalism is valued in the UK and its source of identity comes from the top down. In 
2007 Prime Minister Gordon Brown published an article with Secretary of State Jack Straw 
called The Governance of Britain. One part of this paper, titled “Britain’s Future: The Citizen 
and The State”, focused on what it means to be British and what British values are.58  This article 
was filled with nationalist ideals. Nationalist beliefs in the UK also comes from the mass media - 
BBC did an entire radio show called ‘Britishness’, in which they discussed how to increase 
British patriotism in schools.59 
  In 1992, Linda Colly published a book called ‘Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707 to 
1837’ analyzing how the four states that make up the present-day United Kingdom came 
together. 60  The individual states that compose the United Kingdom-Wales, England, Northern 
Ireland, and Scotland - joined one another as a common nation in 1707.  Their unification 
propelled the nation, as the stock market matured, the navy grew, and insurance developed. 
“Through their empire and trading opportunities that came with it, with a common commitment 
to Protestantism, by a monarchy at the apex of an increasingly interconnected ruling class and 
reinforced by wars against Continental Europe (and especially Catholic France), British 
distinctiveness was clearly defined,” Colly said.61  
                                                        
58 Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, “The Governance of Britain.” 
59 “BBC - Britishness.” 
60 Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, “The Governance of Britain.” 
61 Pincus, “Review of Britons.” 
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After the countries united, money became a huge factor that heightened nationalism as 
well. The collective British government started selling bonds to citizens.  A citizen could loan 
the government money, and eventually, they would get their money back plus interest.62  With 
this, citizens gained a monetary investment in the government.  More than ever, citizens wanted 
Britain to stabilize so they could get their investment back.  Thus, politics became more tolerant, 
as radical overthrows of the government or war meant citizens were less likely to see this return 
on investment.63   
The United Kingdom is unique, as it is one nation made up of four independent, 
sovereign states. The marriage of Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and England made 
nationalism and identity complicated. “Why is it that one can talk of the Europeanization of 
German national identity, but not British?” Checkel said.64   
 Unlike the term ‘French’ or ‘Dutch, the term ‘British’ encompasses those other identities 
within it – Scottish, Welsh, English, and other local labels by city are common. The United 
Kingdom was “an invented nation superimposed onto much older alignments in loyalties.” 
Colley said.65 In this respect, one might think the British would be more accepting of the 
additional European identity, as their culture has always allowed for multiple, interchangeable 
identities, but sociologist Richard Keily argues this isn’t the case. The British are unique in that 
they are first and foremost British. Some Brits even go as far as saying they are not European. 
This categorization of national identity is unique in the UK. 
 One of the most influential methodological tools for probing multiple identities, such as 
British, Scottish, or European, are the so-called Moreno questions. Rather than asking 
                                                        
62 Coltrain, “18th Century America.” 
63 Coltrain. 
64 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.” 
65 Pincus, “Review of Britons.” 
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respondents about a specific identity they associate with, they ask respondents to rank their 
identities in a five-point hierarchy: Scottish66 not British; more Scottish than British, equally 
Scottish and British; more British than Scottish; British, not Scottish.  
In 2013, the Government Office of Science commissioned a project analyzing changing 
identities in the UK with this test.67 The results showed that people identified with the four 
territories of the UK far more than they identified with being British in general.  Depending on 
their home country, the highest ranked answers for the respondents consistently were ‘Welsh, not 
British’, ‘Scottish, not British’, ‘English, not British’, or ‘Irish, not British’.68  
 Similar to the way they do not acknowledge British identity as much as their regional 
identity, people in the UK are hesitant to acknowledge a European identity. The Government 
Office of Science provides two pieces of evidence supporting this claim.  In Table 169, we see the 
proportion of people in the United Kingdom who claim ‘European’ as part of their identity.70 
This chart shows that between 2003 and 2011, at most 16% of the British population claimed to 
be European. Similar results have been traced back to the 1990s.  “Feeling European is 
apparently very much a minority identity in the UK – and one that shows no sign of becoming 
more commonplace over time.”71 
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Table 1 – Percentage of British Citizens that identify as European 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
European 12% 11% 12% 16% 12% 14% 12% 11% 12% 
 
 The second piece of evidence provided by the Government Office for Science are results 
from another Moreno type question. Table 272 analyzes how British citizens compare 
‘Britishness’ versus ‘Europeanism’. These results demonstrate that in almost every year since 
1997, less than 1/3 of the British population has acknowledged any European identity at all73, 
and only a handful, less than 10% every year since 1997, indicate that European identity is more 
important to them than their Britishness.74 Citizens in the United Kingdom who strongly identify 
as European are rare. 
Table 2 – Trends in European Identity versus British Identity using the Moreno Test 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2010 
British 
only 
57% 62% 67% 62% 62% 62% 55% 63% 70% 
British 
and 
European 
29% 27% 23% 27% 27% 28% 35% 31% 24% 
European 
and 
British 
3% 4% 3% 4% 3% 5% 5% 2% 2% 
European 
Only 
6% 5% 3% 2% 2% 3% 2% 1% 2% 
 
 The Government Office of Science offers evidence that those who deny European 
identity are less likely to feel that the UK’s membership in the EU is a ‘good thing’. This data is 
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exhibited in Table 3.75 Even further, amongst that subset of the population, consistently higher 
percentages are saying that it is more of a bad thing than a good thing. In contrast, amongst those 
who acknowledge any amount of European identity, even a secondary identity76, far more say 
Britain’s EU membership is a good thing. 
Table 3 – Attitudes Towards UK membership in the EU by British/European Identity 
% of Brits that say UK 
membership is a… 
British only identity Acknowledge European 
identity 
1995   
Good Thing 23% 68% 
Bad Thing 39% 7% 
2000   
Good Thing 15% 45% 
Bad Thing 30% 13% 
2005   
Good Thing 20% 52% 
Bad Thing 39% 16% 
 
 In other EU nations, identity is claimed differently than in the UK. At least partially 
identifying as European far more is commonplace.  In their book, Revue Internationale de 
Politique Comparée, scholars Alistair Cole and Jocelyn Evans use the Moreno test to explain 
identity in France. Cole and Evans compare Wales and Brittany, a region in France. Application 
of the Moreno Question in these two areas revealed that dual identity is more accepted in 
Brittany than in Wales. Unlike in Wales, there were few conflicts with being both Breton and 
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French or being both French and European.77  Cole and Evan’s results in 2007 greater prove The 
Government Office of Science’s later analysis in 2013.  
National identity, as proven through the Moreno Tests, is more important in the United 
Kingdom than other European nations. As a result, international socialization for the UK has 
been an uncertain and debated process. The UK has had a more difficult time integrating into 
Europe than other EU states, as citizens are hesitant to accept traditions, rules, norms, or beliefs 
other than their own.  As this analysis dives deeper into case studies analyzing specific historical 
events in the UK, one should keep in mind the high regard in which the British citizenry hold 
their national identity. 
Empirical Analysis 
 The rest of this paper focuses on four events in four different time periods, explained 
chronologically.  Departure from an International Governmental Organization (IGO78) is not 
unique to the United Kingdom, though the UK is the first to leave an IGO as large the EU.79  As 
previously stated, analysis of why a state decides to withdraw very much depends on the state 
itself. Examining four points in time gives a full picture of the relationship between the UK and 
the EU.  
 The case studies to follow are pinnacles in the British/European relationship.  In these 
events, one can see the relationship evolve and the ebbs and flows of nationalism in the UK – in 
some cases, nationalism dominates the scene and we see the United Kingdom stray away from 
EU policies and treaties. In other years, the United Kingdom puts nationalist beliefs to the side in 
favor of international cooperation.  Each of these events was chosen to further explore the 
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relationship between identity and institution in the UK and tell us what preempted the 2016 
decision to withdraw. 
The first case study explains The United Kingdom’s journey to join the European Union. 
While they officially joined in 1975, the debate began when the European Coal and Steel 
Community formed in 1945. This section examines that 30-year period and the trials that came 
with attaining membership.   
 The second case study spans only a few years, starting around 1999 and ending in 2003. 
This section deals with the debate of whether or not the UK should keep the pound sterling or 
transition to the euro, like the rest of Europe.  The debate ultimately resulted in the nation 
deciding to keep the pound. 
 The third case study deals with post-2005 national security policies in the United 
Kingdom. In the 21st century, we really start to see the UK’s security policy and interests diverge 
from the rest of Europe.  This ten-year period is also really when the campaign to leave started to 
build and take form.   
Lastly, the fourth and final section deals the 2016 referendum itself. The 2016 
Referendum was not as sudden as many think.  In fact, years of controversy really led to the vote 
which is why a case study analysis analyzing the British and European relationship over time is 
necessary.  
 The case studies are each split into an overview, identity/institution analysis, and 
correlation to Brexit80.  The overview will provide necessary background information, while the 
identity/institution analysis compares and contrasts two key views regarding EU membership. 
The correlation to the 2016 referendum uses the case studies to draw connections between the 
time period at hand and the decision to leave the EU. The purpose of these case studies is to 
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understand British membership in the EU and analyze why the United Kingdom chose to 
withdraw from the European Union. 
1945-1975: The Journey to Join the European Union  
 “The cries of ‘shame’ stabbing through the cheers when the Prime Minister announced 
we are asking for formal application to join the European Economic Community came 
from both sides. So did the portentously eager applause when he insisted that we shall 
not take the final step unless our Commonwealth and other obligations can be reconciled, 
for otherwise, the ‘loss would be greater than the gain’.” – The Guardian, August 196181 
Overview 
 The United Kingdom first applied for membership in the European Community in 1961.  
At the time, proponents of membership were namely the motor industries, manufacturers, 
newspapers, and big businesses, but their beliefs about the benefits of membership weren’t 
shared by all.  Many hated the idea of relying on the economies of their sister European states 
and strongly opposed the application.  “There is a great deal of kicking and screaming to be 
expected.” the Guardian stated in August 1961.82 
 Applying for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) faced backlash 
not only from citizens in Britain but from the six-member states already in the EEC as well. 
Those six included France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. 
Since the UK had been offered membership previously,but declined in pursuit of an American 
alliance, the motives for joining were deeply questioned. Prime Minister Macmillan filed the 
documents in 1961, as the UK economy shifted into a severe recession, forcing him to retract 
Britain’s initial denial.  However, the process to join the EEC wasn’t nearly as simple as they 
                                                        
81 “A Timeline of Britain’s EU Membership in Guardian Reporting.” 
82 “A Timeline of Britain’s EU Membership in Guardian Reporting.” 
 
25 
thought. To be approved for membership, the six current members each needed to vote yes.  Five 
of the six states voted to approve the UK’s application immediately, but France hesitated. In fact, 
French President Charles de Gaulle assessed Britain’s application for over a year before 
ultimately voting no in 1963. 
 President de Gaulle explained his no vote by saying that certain British policies, such as 
labor and agriculture, were incompatible with those of the EEC.  He alluded to the fact that close 
Anglo-American relations would lead the United States to start increasing its influence in 
Europe, adding a western seat at the table that France could not accept.  Along those same lines, 
de Gaulle noted that the British economy, utilizing dollar diplomacy and the GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade) System, was too globalized for the EEC.  Some even 
hypothesized that de Gaulle also voted no as British membership had strong potential to weaken 
the French voice within Europe. “For President de Gaulle, the main objection to an enlarged 
community was that it might lead to an Atlantic community, dominated by the United States.” 
the Guardian said in a January 1963 publication.83  
 After de Gaulle’s veto, the British waited four years and then reapplied for EEC 
membership again.  For the second time, Gaulle single-handedly blocked the application.  Two 
years after the second failed attempt, President de Gaulle retired. Without de Gaulle vetoing on 
behalf of France, the United Kingdom hastily decided to try again for membership. New 
Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath submitted the necessary documents and the United 
Kingdom was shortly thereafter approved for membership by all six voting nations. This 
approval signaled the green light to begin negotiations for membership terms. 
 Negotiations with soon-to-be international allies commenced in 1969, but the UK still 
faced a battle at home. The terms and conditions of membership were considered restrictive and 
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displeased many Brits, but Heath urged Britain to accept the terms anyways and join the EEC. 
Re-negotiations of specific terms could be handled after member status was achieved, he said. 
“The community is, and needs to be, an evolving institution,” the Guardian wrote on January 1, 
1973.84 
 British motives for membership continued to be questioned, particularly regarding the 
question as to why the British were so persistent to join the EEC now when they had initially 
declined. What changed from the early 1960s to 1970 was the strength of the British economy.  
While the EEC economy was booming, the British were facing their worst recession since 
WWII. Businesses were failing, inflation reached a record 27%, the pound was plummeting on 
the exchange market, and the financial instability was causing workforce strikes. In 1972, UK 
unemployment reached a record 1 million people and, to make matters even worse, miner strikes 
over pay ensued causing electricity shortages across the country. After one month without the 
miners working, the strike and recession forced Parliament to declare a national state of 
emergency. The country was experiencing a crisis.  
 While the British were hesitant about the membership terms and conditions the EEC was 
offering, more pressing economic matters overshadowed those concerns. The failing economy 
caused citizens to worry more about feeding their families and keeping their jobs than EEC 
membership. Thus, the terms were quietly accepted, and EEC membership was achieved. 
The official date of entry into the EEC for the United Kingdom, along with Denmark and 
Ireland, was January 1, 1973. The front page of The Guardian read “We’re in – but without the 
fireworks.”  The article went on to say “Britain passed peacefully into Europe at midnight last 
night without any special celebrations. It was difficult to tell that anything of importance had 
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occurred, and a date which will be entered in the history books as long as histories of Britain are 
written was taken by most people as a matter of course.”85  
The poor economy in the United Kingdom didn’t magically disappear as their acceptance 
as a member state in the EEC was made official, however. In 1974, just as they had done two 
years prior, the miners went on strike yet again. In response, Prime Minister Heath called an 
emergency election to reaffirm the direction of the nation. However, he ended up losing that 
election to the Labour Party candidate, Harold Wilson, who thus inherited a nation in shambles. 
 Wilson’s first order of business to get the country back on track was finding a way to get 
all of the miners to return to work.  Under his lead, unionizing gained traction, wages were 
controlled, the government stopped printing money, and income policies were put into place to 
prevent further economic crises.  The British motorcar industry was nearly bankrupt, however, 
compared to a thriving EEC motorcar industry. In hopes of getting the British economy on the 
same level as the EEC, Wilson immediately called for renegotiations of the terms of Britain’s 
membership.  The negotiations lasted almost one year and led to some concessions from the 
EEC, such as the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund,86 but changes 
were minor overall.  
 On March 27, 1975, the Wilson Government recommended that the British electorate 
approve the results of renegotiation. Two intense campaigns began aimed at influencing these 
delegates.  There was the Britain in Europe (BIE) movement, led by the Conservative Party and 
their new leader, Margaret Thatcher, fighting for a ‘Yes’ vote to remain in the EEC. Campaigns 
to restore independence, however, such as the National Referendum Campaign (NRC) were 
equally active, fueled by a nostalgic view of the empire and accompanying desire for 
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independence.87 Wilson ultimately decided to put the renegotiated contract to a referendum and 
let the public decide. 
 Thus, on June 5, 1975, the United Kingdom held its first-ever national referendum 
regarding European integration. A ‘Yes’ vote indicated a desire to remain in the EEC, while a 
‘No’ vote signaled a desire to return to independence. The result came back 67.2% ‘Yes’, 32.8% 
‘No’, determining the British would remain in the EEC for the time being.  
June 5, 1975, therefore remains the de facto date for the UK joining the European 
Community. According to the Guardian, “He [Prime Minister Wilson] celebrated it with a brief 
statement declaring the formal end of the 14-year controversy over Europe and calling on the 
anti-marketers to join wholeheartedly in working inside Europe to solve the economic crisis.”88 
With that, the United Kingdom was in. 
Identity & Institutions Analysis 
 The somewhat tortured journey to join the EEC is a prime example of an ongoing clash 
between identity and institution in the UK. In the 1960s, the British nationalist point of view ran 
alongside President de Gaulle. The nationalists capitalized on the delay that accompanied 
Gaulle’s vetoes, forcing both European and British citizens to think critically about the UK’s 
membership. Nationalists also used this extension to campaign further for British sovereignty. 
Like Gaulle, they emphasized the normative and structural differences between the United 
Kingdom and the EEC.   
The UK was more westernized than the rest of the EEC, and by many accounts, they 
were searching for a different kind of Europe than the EEC would provide. “For Britain to join 
the kind of Europe which President de Gaulle wants would be unthinkable,” wrote the Guardian 
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in 1961.89  Nationalists also pointed to the harsh membership terms and conditions Britain were 
handed, with the official ‘No’ campaign warning of the risk to sovereignty, jobs, and food prices. 
Their efforts, while strong, ultimately only resulted in a 32.8% vote for independence. 
 With 67.2% voting ‘Yes’, advocates for integration, championed by the government and 
conservative opposition obtained the majority. The ‘Yes’ campaign surrounded a range of issues 
from job security to world peace and the Commonwealth. However, those numbers were not 
fully representative of European institutionalist beliefs, as the economic crisis forced many 
nationalists to seek drastic changes. Those who previously valued patriotism over all else reacted 
favorably to the possibility of mutual wins, jointly profitable arrangements, and the compromises 
that came with the EEC membership because of their current situation. In the short term, citizens 
believed the EEC would be able to stabilize the tumultuous British economy. In addition, the 
EEC was seen as a necessary alliance for long-term peace, security, trade, and both regional and 
international development. 
 The diverging opinions over integration clashed for the first time in the 1975 referendum. 
Institutionalism and nationalism were embedded in society as opposing forces in 1961 and their 
conflicting nature set the stage for many debates to come. 
Correlation to Brexit 
 Though occurring roughly 50 years apart, the integration process in the 1960s and 70s 
and the withdrawal process in the 21st century shared certain qualities.  In both eras, British 
opinion about Europe changed as British’s society evolved, the elite led the movement, self-
interested motives set the nation’s agenda, and the European question was at the head of the 
debate.  Each of these three points is further expanded upon below. 
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 First, the 1961 application for membership signaled a complete change in the UK’s then 
current views about European integration. As previously stated, the UK was offered the chance 
to be a founding member of the EEC but declined. Macmillan’s application for membership after 
years of the UK’s disinterest was a symbol of this change. “The internal debate that preceded 
Harold Macmillan’s decision to seek membership featured a cocktail of economic and political 
motivations,” said London School of Economics Professor Piers Ludlow.90 
 It would seem that the change in opinion was primarily due to a change in civilization. 
The poor economy was a major factor, but also many people reported that their increased desire 
to integrate was fueled by inclusion anxiety.91 With the EEC was becoming a potent political 
actor next door, Britain’s position as a world power was steeply declining with the erosion of 
their empire. Stated simply, the British did not want to be left behind as the rest of the EEC 
advanced.  
 In 2016, there was a similar change in opinion, but for different reasons.  The EU’s status 
as a major world power had faltered in the decade prior and various events, such as the election 
of Donald Trump in the United States, sparked a sense of nationalism around the world.  
Patriotic attitudes developed, and similar to the inclusion anxiety the British felt when the EEC 
launched, a desire for solitude and self-control swept over the country.    
A second shared feature of perspectives in the two eras is that in both 1975 and 2016 the 
British elite led the movement to effectuate the change. For the elite in 1975, the prospect of 
being able to steer Europe from within had its appeal, as the British at the time were stuck in a 
cycle of repeated failure attempting to influence the world and Europe from afar. When the elite 
got on board, much of the country followed. Likewise, in the 21st century, when the upper-class 
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citizens shifted their focus homeward and on national issues, others followed suit with the same 
sense of patriotism.  
The third parallel drawn here between the 1960s and 2016 is that the applications for 
membership and for withdrawal caused the UK to develop a list of needs. Primarily, the list was 
filled with short-term, immediate crises that needed attention. Britain applied for membership 
namely to address these short-term needs and to stabilize their economy and regain their status as 
a world power.  Once the UK’s short-term needs were met, EEC membership was no longer 
necessary and many to returned to their former patriotic emphasis.   
 Historical institutionalist theory can also help correlate the initial years of integration and 
the later years of disintegration as well.  In the initial years, British citizens learned about the 
realities of community enlargement. Being shut down by Gaulle forced the British citizens to 
learn first-hand how change in the EEC is slow and painful, they adhere to strict rules that each 
applicant must conform to.  Many of the agreements and treaties in place within the community 
since the beginning have been painstakingly stitched together and cannot simply be undone.  
Thus, it quickly became clear in negotiations that these talks were not between equals – the EEC 
ran the show in 1973 and they would be making the ultimate decision regarding Britain’s terms 
of membership. “Instead, it was a process where Britain had to demonstrate how they would 
adapt to the community system.”92 Following the vote to leave the EU in 2016, the British faced 
the same circumstance. Negotiations between Prime Minister Theresa May and the European 
Union Council regarding the divorce have been slow and painful. The EU has conceded to few 
of the British demands.  
 Lastly, the two time periods share the battle of identity versus institution. The European 
question has been divisive for the UK since the EEC was created.  It was in the 1960s ‘Europe’ 
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became a hot button term in the UK, forcing people to choose between neighborly cooperation 
individual strength. This question divided the Conservative and Labour parties and split almost 
all of the elite groups in the country - civil service, academia, government leaders, etc. The 
debate regarding British membership in the EU, while a hot current event, has existed for 
decades. 
 Since integrating with Europe, much of its allure has faded for the UK. The idea of 
Europe as an area of booming economic growth subsided.  In fact, Europe’s economy isn’t 
known for its dynamism any more, but more for its fragility. History has changed both the UK 
and the EU structurally and culturally, but even through the changes, the concept of identity in 
the UK has remained the same. The conflict between this identity and institution may have had 
its latest battle in 2016, but the first encounter provided its beginnings in 1961. 
2003: The United Kingdom votes to keep the Pound Sterling  
“Integration is the most important asset Europe has, and the key component to European 
integration is the Euro.” – Anibal Cavaco Silva, 19th President of Portugal93 
Overview 
 On January 1, 2002, twelve European Union members traded in their individual 
currencies for the Euro (€), the new common currency of the EU. The new currency propelled 
nations into a geographic and economic partnership known as the Eurozone. By agreement, the 
United Kingdom and Denmark are the only nations in the EU exempt from adopting the Euro.  
All other members must enter the Eurozone after meeting certain economic criterion.  
 Though not legally obligated, the United Kingdom was initially scheduled to make the 
transition to the Euro around 2003, shortly after the first twelve states had done so. However, the 
process abruptly stalled as a robust debate erupted across the country. Once again, it was a 
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conflict between European integration and British nationalism. Reasoning aside, the debate was 
ultimately won by nationalists as the UK voted to keep the pound sterling. This decision, further 
analyzed below, seems to have primarily stemmed from economic analyses and pressure from 
persuasive British leadership.  
 In the early 2000s, the Euro’s value was weak against both the pound sterling and the US 
dollar. Its relative performance did not come close to competing against currencies tied to the 
UK and US economies.94 However, by the summer of 2002, its value against the US dollar 
picked up, but even with the euro’s increase in value, unemployment in the Eurozone, 
specifically in the powerhouse state Germany, remained extremely high.95 
 EU advocates in the UK recognized significant benefits associated with membership in 
the Eurozone, but nationalists saw these reasons as too complex and restrictive of their 
sovereignty. One currency meant that there were no longer separate national monetary policies, 
and instead, a new central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB).  The ECB is charged with 
providing a Europe-wide monetary policy, keeping interest and exchange rates consistent and 
helping control inflation.96 
 There thus were benefits to Eurozone membership, but also sacrifices member states had 
to make. The most notable of these was that all economic policies would henceforth come from 
the ECB and could no longer be made at home.  This meant that if Germany, for example, 
wanted to introduce an economic policy to combat its high unemployment rate, it would not be 
able to decide this matter as a sovereign nation. The policy could only come from the ECB.97 
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 When the idea of the Eurozone started gaining momentum in the late 1990s, UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair promised to join the Eurozone if a referendum showed a majority of the 
nation favored membership. Blair and Home Secretary Jack Straw, who were both strong 
proponents of EU integration, commissioned an opinion poll in 1997 to gauge whether the UK 
would vote to adopt the Euro. The results showed that 60% of the British population favored 
keeping the pound. 98 Based on these results, Alastair Campbell, political aide to Tony Blair, 
advised caution in issuing a referendum. This was not the result Blair and Straw were hoping for, 
and Campbell recommended waiting to hold a referendum until more people favored the Euro.  
A year later, the Prime Minister’s office commissioned another poll and achieved in roughly the 
same result.99 Blair waited another year and ran a third poll, only to get the same result again – 
that a majority of the British population wanted to keep the pound.  
 After three years, Blair grew tired of waiting and decided a big change was needed to 
influence public opinion. He helped launch the largest bi-partisan British campaign ever, in favor 
of adopting the Euro, called “Britain in Europe.”100 This campaign was heavily funded and 
supported by many in the government. Soon after its launch, a rival campaign flourished called 
“Business for Sterling”101, that was aimed at keeping the pound sterling.  ‘Business for Sterling’ 
was supported by prominent former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and received funds from 
ordinary people all throughout the country.  Almost as quickly as it began, the nationalist 
campaign matched ‘Britain in Europe’ in funds and stature. Again, these two opposing sides 
were leaving the nation split between European integration and national identity. 
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 Ed Balls, Chief Economic Advisor to the Treasury, did not share Blair’s urgency to vote 
on the matter and publicly stated there more pressing issues than the Eurozone.  Chancellor 
Gordon Brown then stepped in and disagreed, stating the matter should indeed be decided 
immediately. Brown thus created the so-called ‘Five-Test Policy’ to settle the debate.102  The 
‘Five Test Policy’ stated if the United Kingdom passed five different tests, they would join the 
Eurozone.  If they did not pass all five, it meant they weren’t ready would keep the pound 
sterling for the time being. 
 Prime Minister Blair publicly dismissed the tests because of his perception of their bias, 
stating they were heavily structured to favor the pound sterling.  In his view, these tests as 
written would not produce a fair assessment of Britain’s compatibility with the Eurozone. He 
further restated his position that the United Kingdom should join the Eurozone for critical policy 
reasons. Blair and others believed that the five economic tests as constructed set benchmarks so 
difficult to satisfy that a movement to the Euro could never be justified.103 
 Ultimately, a Treasury analysis provided Brown a strong enough arsenal to fend of the 
less-than-enthusiastic Blair, and so the five-test policy was carried out.  The five tests conducted 
were as follows:104 
1. Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others could 
live with euro interest rates on a permanent basis?  
2. If problems emerge, is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them?  
3. Would joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) create better conditions for firms 
making long term decisions to invest in Britain?  
4. What impact would entry into EMU have on the financial services industry?  
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5. In summary, will joining EMU promote higher growth, stability, and a lasting increase 
in jobs?  
 These tests were meant to examine whether the European system produced enough 
flexibility for Britain to deal with their own economic problems, a matter important to many.  
They also assessed the impact on London, the nation’s financial sector, as London needed to 
remain in a competitive position internationally. In short, adoption of the Euro had much to 
prove - namely that it would promote employment growth, enhance stability, increase jobs, and 
keep interest rates compatible and steady.105 
 Unsurprising to Blair and others who had dismissed the tests from the beginning, four out 
of five tests failed, with the only one passing being the fourth, which was aimed at keeping 
London competitive in the financial services industry. Pro-Euro cabinet members like Charles 
Clarke and Patricia Hewitt complained that the decision had been pre-ordained, but given that 
the tests had already been conducted, it was too late.106 So as simple as that, Euro membership 
was off the agenda for the foreseeable future and a referendum was not held.   
Identity & Institution Analysis 
 Chancellor Brown and the nationalists had an entire arsenal of reasons the UK should 
not, and did not, join the Eurozone in addition to the five-test policy. These reasons seem to fall 
into three primary categories.  First, the British desire for independence and sovereignty did not 
align with the Eurozone. Second, the British people were reluctant to change. Third, the UK 
economy was more westernized than the rest of Europe, causing the two to diverge on a number 
of financial matters. 
 The British desire for sovereignty justified keeping the pound because the British 
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populace did not want to abdicate control of their own interest rate policies. As previously stated, 
Euro interest rates are set by the European Central Bank, and thus were not necessarily suitable 
for the UK. The ECB is responsible for the entire Euro economy, not just one member when 
setting rates.  The way they set rates would cause British interest rates to fall from 5.52% to 
2.25%, resulting in inflationary pressures. 107 
Also, under the ECB, the UK would also be forced to meet Euro convergence data, 
including maintaining a debt-to-GDP ratio that limited British fiscal policy. With the Euro, the 
UK economy faced the prospect of being severely impacted if the British needed to avoid or 
recover from a recession. The Bank of England also could no longer act as a lender of last resort, 
buying bonds during a temporary shortfall.  Bond markets would thus become much more 
uncertain and require higher bond yields to compensate for their increased risk.108 Furthermore, 
homeowners in the UK are already extremely sensitive to change, with their mortgage payments 
already higher percentages of their income than in many parts of the developed world, including 
the US. In summary, the British reluctance to change is arguably just as deeply rooted as their 
desire for sovereignty, and the Eurozone system would remove significant features of that 
sovereignty.  
 Finally, the British economy has been more westernized than the rest of Europe. They 
were at a different stage in the trade cycle than the rest of the Eurozone at the turn of the century 
because their economy had been growing much faster. The UK thus had a lower unemployment 
rate than the rest of the Eurozone and greater export flexibility. Put simply, the British economy 
did not need the Euro. The differences in the two systems had the potential to cause more harm 
than benefit.   
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 Brown and the nationalists’ arguments were only a viable option as the Eurozone did not 
provide enough benefit to compensate for the risk.  The nationalists also emphasized the 
sociological institutionalist theory through the arguments that the two systems did not align. The 
Brits did not comply with the same norms or rules as the rest of Europe and had a more 
westernized economy. Thus, the transition would have been difficult. 
 Brown’s position was not shared by all, however, given that Blair and other European 
Union advocates supported the Eurozone.  “Britain in Europe” argued two main points in favor 
of Eurozone membership - increased stability and overall gains. The argument for increased 
stability capitalized on exchange rate stability. Trade would become easier with other nations and 
would not fluctuate as other economies waivered.  In the early 2000s, low inflation characterized 
the Eurozone.  There was a time in history in which the United Kingdom was known as the ‘sick 
man of Europe’, as its economy was characterized by boom and bust cycles and high inflation.  
Blair and other European advocates argued that the Eurozone would provide a strong, safe 
framework to prevent another crash in their economy.   
These EU advocates claimed joining the Eurozone would not only increase stability but 
also give the UK an advantage in terms of lower transaction costs and trade amongst other 
members – overall gains.  The increased cooperation would bring greater opportunities and 
inward investment, or investment into the UK from sister EU nations. They were optimistic their 
economy would soar within the Eurozone.  
Ultimately, the majority of British people believed the potential benefits of the Euro were 
outweighed by the costs, proving the sense of nationalism was stronger than the desire to 
integrate.  By weighing the potential benefits, and sociological institutionalism pointing out the 
cultural differences, the decision to keep the pound was clearly won by this nationalist sect in the 
UK, the same side that ultimately voted to withdraw from the EU in 2016 as well. 
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Correlation to Brexit 
 The reasoning behind keeping the pound sterling showed indicators that the UK was not 
fully integrated into the EU. Retaining the pound sterling also showed strength in the identity 
side, demonstrating British nationalism was too strong to fully integrate. The decision to keep the 
pound further signaled that majority of the Brits did not wish to accept the norms or rules of the 
Eurozone community, causing them to stray in terms of sociological institutionalism. 
The British also have clearly shown a desire for sovereignty and distaste for restraints 
imposed by the ECB. Instead, they demonstrated they have always wanted to self-govern. They 
demonstrated a reluctance to change and deep roots in their home ways. They further proved the 
differences between their nation and the rest of Europe in more ways than meet the eye.  
These main points argued by the nationalists in 2003 carried over to the 2016 referendum 
and decision to withdraw from the EU.  Sociological institutionalist theories show the lack of 
shared beliefs.  In addition, the decision to not adopt the Euro and keep the pound made 
withdrawing from the European Union much simpler. If France, for example, were to withdraw 
they would need to re-create and reinstate a whole new currency system.  Without the Euro, it 
was much easier for the United Kingdom to leave than other Eurozone nations. 
2005-2015: National security policies in the United Kingdom intensify 
 “The partnership with the United States is our most important bilateral relationship and 
central to our national security.” 
– Parliament’s 2008 National Security Strategy for the United Kingdom109 
Overview 
 In 2005, David Cameron was elected Prime Minister of the United Kingdom running on a 
platform to ‘Stop Banging on about Europe!’. Cameron wasn’t necessarily a Euroskeptic, his 
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priorities just focused more on issues within the United Kingdom. More specifically, with the 
election of Cameron coming shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the 
United Kingdom concentrated on reforming its national security policy.  
National security discussions in Parliament became more frequent and counterterrorism 
methods increased. As a result, budgeting skyrocketed. In 2001, the UK allotted approximately 
£1 billion to national security, but by 2008 they raised that number to £2.5 billion. By 2010, 
financing increased to £3.5 billion and by 2020-2021, national security costs are projected to be 
£4.7 billion.110  
National security has evolved in the 21st century with burgeoning technology and the new 
world of cyber warfare.  These momentous new national security issues and their accompanying 
budget provoked reservations about EU policies in the UK. Specifically, four major items 
became points of contention - the Schengen Zone, terrorism, the migration crisis, and the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ).  
 The Schengen Zone is the first area of disconnect regarding security between the UK and 
the EU, though it existed long before Cameron came into power and Britain’s national security 
policies evolved.  The agreement, first signed in Schengen, Luxembourg, in 1985, abolished 
many of the EU’s internal borders enabling passport-free movement between member states. It 
fully took effect in 1990 in Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.111 
Other countries quickly followed. Currently, there are 26 Schengen countries; 22 are EU 
members and four are not: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. Only six of the 28 
EU member states are outside the Schengen Zone.  Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, and Romania have 
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yet to be admitted, while the UK and Republic of Ireland have declined to participate. The UK 
and Ireland have been insistent on maintaining its own borders since 1990. 
 The Schengen Zone is often criticized by Euroskeptics who say ‘it is an open door for 
criminals and migrants’112, which leads to the second point of contention – terrorism.  The 2015 
terrorist attacks in Paris that killed 130 people prompted an urgent evaluation of the Schengen 
agreement.  Citizens and government leaders alike were alarmed by how easily the killers 
slipped into Paris and how easily they escaped. The European Commission was under immense 
pressure to reinstate temporary border controls, and emergency meetings were held to discuss 
such implementation.113 
Many believe the terrorists in Paris entered the EU with crowds of migrants via Greece, 
which brings the third primary disconnect between the UK and the EU – the migrant crisis. In 
2015, more than a million migrants, many of them Syrian refugees, heightened pressure on the 
EU to reinstate temporary border controls. Tensions between EU member states regarding the 
surge of immigrants coming from the Middle East and Africa remains high.114 
In the past two and a half years, the UK has accepted more than 10,000 Syrian 
refugees.115 Eastern European and other Middle Eastern immigrants are common as well.  In the 
Financial Times, Economics Editor Chris Giles provided charts expressing the impact of 
immigration on the UK. “Migrants from eastern European countries that joined the EU after 
2004 are more likely to be working than any other group in Britain.”116  This statistic angered 
many British citizens, who thought it meant migrants were taking their jobs. Giles included a 
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statement saying, “There is no evidence that European migrants came to live a life on benefits or 
took jobs from Brits.”117 
Giles further goes on to discuss crime, as it is regularly correlated with migration in the 
UK. “Though crime rates have fallen in the years immigration has risen, there are still concerns 
that migrants are disproportionately responsible.”118 This brings us to the fourth and final major 
development in the EU that angered British citizens and officials – the European Court of 
Justice.  
In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty was signed making ‘The Court of Justice of the European 
Union’, or the ECJ, the EU’s highest legal authority. The ECJ interprets and enforces rules of the 
single market, settle disputes between member countries, and is the supreme court tasked with 
interpreting EU law.119  As a result, the ECJ restricts British influence and reduces the authority 
of the British judiciary. Thus, the vast majority of British citizens view it with resentment and 
hostility.   
Once in office, Prime Minister Cameron responded to the Lisbon Treaty in outrage, 
promising to renegotiate British terms in the European Union if any future treaty transfers power 
from the UK to the EU. The Brits responded by expressing a strong desire for their laws to be 
made by Parliament, not a foreign court. Brexit Secretary David Davis compared ECJ 
governance to Britain’s national sport of football when he told BBC “If Manchester United goes 
to play Real Madrid, they don’t allow Real Madrid to nominate the referee. It needs to be a joint 
agreement.”120  
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The UK’s particularly strong aversion to the ECJ could stem from the fact that its 
overriding control makes it difficult for British politicians to rule on international matters, such 
as the deportation of terrorists. However, the objection could also be because many in the UK 
want full control/sovereignty and do not trust the ECJ making decisions for them. ECJ judgments 
are not always clear.  According to Catherine Barnard, Professor of European Law at Cambridge, 
“Because the ECJ was written in one language which is translated into 23, and they can only give 
a single judgment, it is inevitably a compromise.”121  
The fact the UK operates under a common law system is another complicating factor, as 
the UK governs differently than any other member state. Most EU countries have civil law 
systems, meaning they follow more formal, codified laws.  British law, on the other hand, is not 
codified.  Countries with common law systems are developed by judges who apply statute, set 
precedent, and determine law on a case-by-case basis.122 The ECJ is tailored more for civil law 
systems though, as it is used by a vast majority of their member states.  The EU member states 
that utilize civil versus common law, and the original influences of their legal systems, are 
depicted below in Table 4.123 
Table 4 – EU Member States, Primary Legal System, & Description of Influences 
 
EU Member 
 
 
Legal System 
 
Original Influence 
Austria Civil Based on Germanic Civil law 
Belgium Civil A heavily modified version of the Napoleonic Code 
Bulgaria Civil Based on Germanic and Roman systems 
Croatia Civil Based on Germanic and Austrian systems 
Cyprus Civil Based on Germanic Civil law 
Czech Republic Civil Based on Germanic Civil law 
Denmark Civil Based on Nordic law 
Estonia Civil Based on Germanic Civil law 
Finland Civil Based on Nordic law 
                                                        
121 “9 Reasons Why (Some) Brits Hate Europe’s Highest Court – POLITICO.” 
122 “The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions.” 
123 “All Countries Compared for Government > Civil Law System.” 
 
44 
France Civil Based on Napoleonic Code 
Germany Civil Influenced by Roman and German law 
Greece Civil Based on Germanic civil law 
Hungary Civil Based on Germanic and Roman systems with elements 
of the Napoleonic Code 
Ireland Common Based on English Common Law 
Italy Civil Based on Germanic Civil law with elements of the 
Napoleonic Code 
Latvia Civil Based on Germanic Civil law and the Napoleonic Code 
Lithuania Civil Based on Dutch Civil law 
Luxembourg Civil Based on Napoleonic Code 
Malta Civil & Common Merges Napoleonic Code, English Common Law, and 
Italian Civil Law 
Netherlands Civil Based on Napoleonic Code with German influence 
Poland Civil Independent Polish Civil Code 
Portugal Civil Influenced by Napoleonic Code and later by German 
Civil Law 
Romania Civil Based on Civil Code of Quebec and Napoleonic Code 
Slovakia Civil Based on Austrian Empire Civil Code 
Slovenia Civil Based on Germanic and Austro-Hungarian law systems 
Spain Civil Merges both Napoleonic Code and Castilian Traditions 
Sweden Civil Based on Nordic Law 
United Kingdom Common Primarily developed in the Middle Ages 
The governance of the ECJ has highlighted these differences and deepened British angst. 
After 2005, British leaders began looking at more global institutions and IGO’s outside of the 
European Union. This outward-looking view is demonstrated in the UK’s national security 
report.  
Every year, the British cabinet produces a report addressing important matters like the 
Schengen Zone, migrant crisis, terrorism, or European Court of Justice. In 2008, the report 
specifically addressed globalization. As globalization in the world increased, the UK’s national 
security policy stated they needed to adjust accordingly. “The UK follows a multilateral, rules-
based approach led by international institutions”, the report cites.  “Just as globalisation 
exacerbates the challenges, it also creates new opportunities for multilateral response, using 
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trading, political, social, and cultural links to build wider cooperation.”124 This 2008 report is an 
indication that the UK was starting to look beyond the European Union. 
In 2018, a national security brief was again issued by Parliament, but this time under 
completely new circumstances post-Brexit. “We are an open, outward-looking, tolerant 
European country that celebrates our history and diversity, confident of our place in the world, 
meeting our obligations to our near neighbors and far off friends, and proud to stand up for our 
values.” Prime Minister Theresa May said. “I am confident that we can rise to the challenges 
ahead and that we can build on our considerable strengths to enhance our national security.”125 
While the 2018 report was primarily introspective, May and the Cabinet still discussed 
how Europe’s security and the United Kingdom’s security are heavily intertwined.  “Europe’s 
security is our security,” May said, confirming the decision to leave the EU does not alter the 
British commitment to improved security.126  
Identity & Institutional Analysis 
The four points discussed above are interconnected and share the battle of identity versus 
institution. The fact that many British citizens do not like the ECJ stems from the strong sense of 
nationalism in the UK. While a plethora of reasons are listed above, another not to be forgotten is 
simple – the ECJ has ‘Europe’ in the title. In the United Kingdom, British citizenship is more 
valued than European identity. The majority of British citizens have strong independence and 
desire for separation of Europe, demonstrated through their distinct history, individual way of 
thinking, and the results of the Moreno test described previously. After the 2016 Brexit 
referendum and early in Theresa May’s negotiations to leave the EU, she made departure from 
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the ECJ a compulsory condition.127 The United Kingdom citizenry had a strong desire to govern 
themselves outside of external control.  
When the migrant crisis began, the EU welcomed the refugees and placed them 
throughout their member states.  The United Kingdom was less than thrilled, but under the 
governing jurisdiction of the ECJ, the matter was out of their control.  The number of migrants 
worldwide exploded over 200% between 1960 and 2015128, and resentment for the lack of input 
and decision making in that crisis grew to unprecedented levels. 
In terms of sociological institutionalism, the UK never fully accepted the norms or ideas 
of the European Union.  The UK had a different legal system, utilizing common law instead of 
civil law, making the decisions of the ECJ less transferrable.  The UK also refused to join the 
Schengen Zone and insisted on maintaining their own borders.  The EU also had different policy 
goals than the United Kingdom and had a different legal system. The UK was also interested in 
looking globally for primary alliances, unlike much Europe. 
As globalization increased, the UK saw doors open with the rest of the world.  
Cooperation and trade agreements with one’s neighbors were no longer a necessary part of 
society, as technology had increased and made worldwide communication instantaneous.  In 
terms of GDP per capita and population, the five top-ranking world powers in order are the 
United States, Russia, China, Germany, and then the United Kingdom.  If extended to the top ten 
world powers, the only European states that made the cut are Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom.129 If Britain wanted to remain a top world power, they recognized cooperation with 
the other 7 of the top world powers was necessary.  The world was more powerful than Europe 
alone, explaining why Britain began looking further outward. 
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Correlation to Brexit 
 The shift in policy starting around 2005 is a predictor of the 2016 decision to withdraw 
from the EU. In 2008, Parliament hinted they were looking beyond the European Union when it 
came to trade, politics, and cooperation.  Also, in 2008, they discussed the trend of globalization 
and how Britain would adapt to the changing world – a foreshadowing sign of their withdrawal 
soon to come.   
 The points of contention regarding security between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union reflect a long-expressed dissatisfaction with EU policies. The UK didn’t like 
being controlled by the ECJ, they didn’t join the Schengen Zone, and the migrant crisis was 
bringing the negatives of EU membership to the forefront. These items, while significant 
separately, combined to nullify the positives of membership.   
2016: The United Kingdom votes to leave the EU  
“2016 was the end of the world as we know it…” – The Guardian, December 25, 2016 
Overview 
 In 2016, the battle between identity and institution came to across its largest hurdle yet – 
the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union.  Though the vote to leave was in 
June of 2016, membership began rapidly deteriorating in 2013, when Prime Minister David 
Cameron first proposed a referendum. Cameron thought attaining better membership terms for 
the UK would improve his chances at the ballot box and reconcile factions within his political 
party.  He was confident the referendum would just lead to better terms and conditions for Great 
Britain’s membership in the EU. Cameron never intended to leave, but this gamble proved to be 
an immense miscalculation. The series of events beginning in 1945 set in motion the 2016 
decision to withdraw, although a few short-term events were also significant contributing factors. 
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 In the historic 2013 Bloomberg Speech, Cameron acknowledged multiple problems with 
the UK’s EU membership. He promised that if he were to win the 2015 Prime Minister election, 
he would meet with EU leaders to renegotiate the terms of membership. Following said 
negotiations, Cameron promised he would let the British citizenry decide whether or not they 
wanted to remain in the EU. 
 With that campaign promise resonating, Cameron won swiftly, and he immediately 
commenced EU negotiations. The discussions lasted only a few months, during the winter of 
2015, which put the United Kingdom 18 months ahead of Cameron’s intended negotiation 
schedule. George Osborne, the British Finance Minister, expressed concern with the time table 
and urged Cameron to extend the negotiations for more time. Cameron denied Osborne’s 
recommendation and proceeded anyway, scheduling the referendum for June 23, 2016. 
 Cameron’s negotiations with the European Union produced only minor, cosmetic 
changes to British membership terms, meaning the referendum would be voted on mostly the 
status quo. Osborne deeply feared this and took over negotiations. George Osborne was known 
for being ruthless, cunning, and clever. And that’s exactly the manner in which he approached 
the referendum. He decided with the short time in which to work and not much to show for new 
terms as a result of the negotiation, the best way to ensure Britain stayed a member state of the 
European Union was to make them scared of what life would be like outside the protection of the 
EU, better known as ‘Project Fear’. ‘Project Fear’ was not the first-time Osborne used a scare 
tactic to influence a vote. This method worked flawlessly in Scotland in 2014, when Scotland 
tried to secede from the United Kingdom. However, Project Fear did not yield the same results in 
2016.  
 Cameron’s role in the British referendum was significant. The vote arguably wouldn’t 
have happened without his persistence and significant miscalculation of time needed to secure 
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better EU terms. However, the results of the referendum weren’t entirely due to Cameron. The 
outcome wasn’t what he intended or even desired. Various social, economic, and political factors 
and the rise of British nationalism contributed to the majority of citizens in the United Kingdom 
voting to leave.   
The leave campaign was composed primarily of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), a 
political party that had been campaigning for Britain’s exit from the EU for years.  In 2016, 
UKIP was joined by roughly half of the Conservative Party, including leaders Boris Johnson and 
five other Cabinet members.130 A handful of Labour Members in Parliament (MP’s) and the 
Northern Ireland Party were also in favor of leaving. 
 These citizens favored independence from the EU for many reasons. Namely because the 
EU was growing in power.  The EU imposed dozens of rules on British businesses and charged 
billions of pounds each year in membership fees with little coming back to the UK.  The Brexit 
proponents wanted the UK to make their own laws again, rather than have laws created for them 
through shared decision-making in the EU.  They wanted to take back control of Britain’s 
borders and reduce the number of people migrating to the UK, per EU mandate. 
 The other side, hoping to remain in the European Union, was led by Prime Minister 
Cameron. Sixteen members of his cabinet, including current Prime Minister Teresa May, backed 
staying in.  While the Conservative Party was split on the issue and officially remained neutral, 
the Labour Party, Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, Green Party, and Liberal Democrats all 
favored remaining.  Big businesses also favored remaining, as membership made it easier for 
them to earn, transfer money, and trade products around the world. The biggest argument the 
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stay campaign made was that Britain’s status would be damaged if they were to leave. “We are 
more secure as part of the 28-nation club, rather than going at it alone,” Hunt said.131 
 Ultimately, these two sides battled against one another in a fierce quick campaign. The 
‘Leave’ campaign ended up winning the election by narrow margins, making the decision to 
leave the EU official.  After the vote was decided, David Cameron immediately stepped down as 
Prime Minister, stating he cannot negotiate a decision he doesn’t believe in. Shortly thereafter, 
Theresa May was elected Prime Minister and began the Article 50 negotiations to leave the 
European Union.  The United Kingdom is scheduled to make the official departure on March 29, 
2019.  
Identity & Institutional Analysis 
 2016 left the world in uncertainty, from the British referendum to the American election 
of President Donald Trump. “The twin political earthquakes of 2016 were widely perceived as a 
revolt against globalization and a call for strengthening national sovereignty.” US State 
Department official Anne-Marie Slaughter said.132 Citizens in many parts of the world began 
reacting against globalization in the name of what appeared to be deeply emotional ties to their 
culture and country. “People want to take their country back,” President Trump said in Scotland 
after Brexit in 2016, “They want to have independence in a sense.”133 
 In the 21st century, nationalist movements shifted away from vocal minorities toward 
demographic classes. Economic stagnation in the lower and middle classes made citizens feel 
like their country was being taken away. They rose up to take control of their identity. “This will 
be a victory for the real people, a victory for the ordinary people.” Nigel Farage, head of UKIP, 
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said in his Brexit victory speech. 134 “People are not voting according to how well off they want 
the country to be, or even how well off they want to be, but how big they want to feel… Politics 
in 2016 was about status.” said author and journalist Ian Leslie.135  
 Nationalist identity, with an ironic outward-looking global dimension, swept over both 
the world and the UK in 2016, but it hit the UK a lot harder than elsewhere. The sharp influx of 
nationalism, combined with various short-term causes promoted by Cameron and political 
leaders, in addition to historical sticking points made the UK vote to leave.  Ease came to the 
United Kingdom that other nations didn’t have; they withheld from joining the Eurozone and 
Schengen Zone. With strong nationalism and weakening institutionalism defining the leave and 
remain campaigns, respectively, it’s no surprise the result of the vote to leave was successful. 
Overall Analysis 
 The United Kingdom first threatened to withdraw in 1975, just after they had joined the 
European Economic Community. States often threaten to leave as a negotiation strategy, and in 
1975, this worked for the UK. Britain struck a favorable deal by nearly walking away from the 
EEC, but the same result did not occur in 2016.  The 2016 Brexit threat was not enough to garner 
the EU reforms the UK wanted. 
 The United Kingdom decision to withdraw from the EU can be best explained through 
the three historical events described previously and two types of institutionalism – sociological 
institutionalism, and historical institutionalism.  The differences in culture bring back the point 
of sociological institutionalism – the UK was never fully socialized in the EU, dating back to its 
initial application for membership in the 1960s. The UK has always been more westernized than 
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the rest of Europe, Charles de Gaulle saw it back in the 1960s and many observed it in the 21st 
century as well.  
The United Kingdom is an island, isolated from the rest of Europe, sharing borders only 
with the sea.  They are isolated by geography, but showed isolation on an even deeper level, as 
the UK constantly negotiated with the EU trying to get better terms and conditions. They showed 
isolation even further as they voted to keep the pound and declined to join the Schengen Zone, 
opting to protect their own borders and making it easier to withdraw. The UK was a member of 
Europe, but they valued state sovereignty and country pride more than European membership.  
 Historical institutionalists pointed out that institutions evolve over time. When the United 
Kingdom joined the European Community, their missions aligned and the two mutually 
benefitted from cooperation. The UK needed help financially, wanted more protection from a 
security standpoint, and EU membership offered them the deepest benefits with the most 
efficiency. But the world has changed immensely since the conception of the European 
Community.   As security changed and the EU gained more power, differences in their legal 
systems became more prominent, technology made communication more universal, and 
economic circumstances evolved, causing interests to diverge.  
In 2016, two important things happened; nostalgic nationalism sharply increased and the 
institutional aspects of the European Union were viewed as more restrictive than beneficial. 
These factors led many to desire independence.  States are constantly looking to maximize 
situations to their own advantage. Sometimes that is cooperation, and that meant membership in 
the European Union for the United Kingdom in much of the 20th Century. However, in 2016, the 
majority of British citizens decided the maximum benefits for the UK were not going to be 
achieved as an EU member state and thus, they voted in support of Brexit. 
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Conclusion 
“We have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are 
linked but not combined. We are interested and associated but not absorbed. If Britain 
must choose between Europe and the open sea, she must always choose the open sea.”  
– Winston Churchill, House of Commons, 1953 
 In 1961, international theorist Ernest Haas analyzed European integration as it emerged 
on the scene. “Regional blocs had the potential to be ‘islands of cooperation’ that might build a 
bridge toward universal peace.” He said.136 Haas looked at the puzzle and the implications of 
European integration, wondering if it would be imitated and generate transnational spillovers in 
other states. For decades, the answer seemed to be yes, and it looked like the world was on an 
unstoppable march toward integration. Multinational corporations and new technologies 
advanced and knit together countries across the world.  However, that global, cooperative 
approach has since slowed. 
The 2016 election of Donald Trump, the changes in Chinese policy, Brexit, and the 
current wave of authoritarian populist challenges have brought increased attention to countries 
withdrawing from international organizations. While the United Kingdom is the first to leave the 
EU, member-state withdrawals from IGO’s have been happening since WWII. 
There have been approximately 200 withdrawals from international organizations since 
1945, per Inkin Von Borzykowski and Felicity Vabulus, political scientists.  In 1970, Honduras 
left the Central American Common Market (SICA). In 2000, Tanzania exited the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). In 2008, Uzbekistan decided to leave the 
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Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC).137 Though there have been over 200 of these 
withdrawals, we know very little about their effects. 
Von Borzykowski and Vabulus argue consequences depend on the state, as different 
states face different withdrawal processes and are intertwined to different levels.  They argue 
states will face political costs, as international investors and analysts may adjudicate the states 
retreat negatively, as they have reneged on an international commitment.  Economic costs are 
also a factor but are unlikely to be too destructive financially, as states surely do a cost-benefit 
analysis before exiting.138 However, the more institutionalized the IGO is, the higher the costs 
states are likely to pay. 
Brexit is a unique case because of its large scale - The United Kingdom is the world’s 5th 
largest economy and they voted to leave the world’s most interdependent union. States in the EU 
lean on the highly structured and institutionalized aspect of the IGO to balance their differences, 
increasing their sociological reliance. Sharing norms, standards, and aspects of their independent 
cultures lower the probability of conflict by essentially tying member states hands together. The 
increase of independent identity and nationalism challenged this sociological institutionalism of 
the EU for the United Kingdom.  
The 2016 referendum introduced a totally new political dynamic into Europe that is still 
playing out and impossible to predict.  British expected growth in 2018 was predicted to decline 
from 2.1% to 1.6%.139 The United Kingdom was expected to experience more debt, have fewer 
jobs, and tighten their migration policies, but it’s hard to say what the consequences will actually 
be until the departure is official in March of 2019.  Whether there will be imitators or 
transnational spillovers cannot yet be known. Withdrawals are not homogeneous, as the IGO 
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139 von Borzyskowski and Vabulas. 
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membership or states in question differentiate greatly. However, an in-depth analysis studying 
the relationship of identity and institution in each member state could predict their likelihood to 
stay or leave.   
The United Kingdom has had a rocky relationship with the EU since its conception, they 
were never fully socialized into the EU, and they had challenges with the institutional framework 
laid out for them.  The value they place on Britishness and national identity conflicted with their 
international membership from the beginning as well. All of these points are proven by the case 
studies above and ultimately, all of these factors led to the decision to withdraw in 2016. 
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